In Aaronoff v. Martinez-Senftner  (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 910 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 137] plaintiff’s previous action against her parents for childhood sexual abuse had been dismissed as time-barred.  In it, she had alleged that her mother aided and abetted her father in committing the abuse.  After a subsequent amendment to the statute of limitations reviving for a one-year period childhood sexual abuse actions that otherwise would be time-barred against a defendant whose intentional act or breach of a duty of care to plaintiff was a legal cause of the abuse (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1), plaintiff again sued her mother.  The new action contained the same allegations as the previous one, but added that during the period when she was abused, plaintiff was employed by her mother in the family business, and that her father was her mother’s agent.  The Third District held that the amended section does not revive actions against the perpetrator of the abuse, but is targeted at third-party defendants who, by virtue of being the perpetrator’s employer of principal, could have used safeguards to prevent the sexual assault, under circumstances in which the child’s exposure to the perpetrator resulted from the environment created by such a relationship.  Finding plaintiff’s allegations to have arisen from the parent-child relationship, the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.

In John Doe v. Bakersfield City School District (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 556 [Cal.Rptr.3d 79] the Fifth District held that equitable estoppel may be applied to relieve a claimant of claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act as long as the public entity or its agent engaged in calculated conduct that induced the claimant not to present a claim within the statutory period, and the claimant acted promptly after that conduct ceased.  In support of its conclusion, the court cited John R. v. Oakland Unified School District (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 [769 P.2d 948]; Christopher P. v. Mojave Unified School District (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 165 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 353]; and Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School District (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1023 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 777].

In Raine v. City of Burbank (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1215 [37 Cal.Rptr.3d 899] the Second District found that under the authority of Spitzer v. Good Guys (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1376 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 236], in providing reasonable accommodation to a disabled employee an employer is not required to create a new position.

In Stamps v. Superior Court (2006) Cal.App.4th ____ [__ Cal.Rptr3d ____] the Second District noted that the Unruh Act (Civ. Code § 51) is separate from the Ralph Act (Civ. Code § 51.7) and the Bane Act (Civ. Code § 52.1), although all three are tied to the same remedial statute (Civ. Code § 52).  It said that while Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65 [276 Cal.Rptr. 130] held that a cause of action under the Unruh Act is not available in employment cases, no such rule prevents an employment action from being based on the Ralph Act or Bane act.

In Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1279 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 589] the First District held that a municipal employee with final authority to make considered decisions based on his/her understanding of the law is a policymaker whose decisions are implementations of official municipal policy, satisfying the requirements of Monell v. NYC (1978) 436 U.S. 658 [98 S.Ct. 2018].  This means that a discriminatory employment decision made by such an employee may result in municipal liability under the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. 1983, 1988).  The San Francisco City and County Superior Court had added attorney fees of $1.1 million to a compensatory damages award of $30,000.00.  The First District sent the award back for recalculation, saying that although the Act authorizes the award of attorney fees to a successful plaintiff, courts should display restraint in approving awards in amounts that constitute a high multiple of damages unless the adjudication results in significant public benefit.

In Ritschel v. City of Fountain Valley (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 107 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 48], plaintiff was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI).  Police officers forcibly drew his blood without informing him of his choice between a blood or urine test, as required by Vehicle Code section 23612.  The Fourth District cited Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757 [86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908], in which the United States Supreme Court found that forcibly drawing blood from a DUI arrestee does not violate the U.S. Constitution.  It also cited the holding in People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168 [171 Cal.Rptr.854] that it does not violate the state constitution.  For that reason, the court affirmed dismissal of plaintiff’s claims under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1983) and California’s Bane Act (Civ. Code § 52.1).  After examining audio and videotaped evidence, the court concluded as a matter of law that the force used by officers was not excessive, so it also affirmed dismissal of plaintiff’s common law actions for assault and battery.

In Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 547] the Fourth District concluded that a letter sent by a Homeowners’ Association to its members, informing them of and describing litigation between the Association and a member is protected from liability by the Litigation Privilege.  The court found the letter was sufficiently related to litigation to satisfy the requirements of Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187 [847 P.2d 1044].