In Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048 [39 Ca.Rptr.3d 516] the California Supreme Court held that if the gravamen of a cause of action is based on a communicative act that is covered by the Litigation Privilege, the privilege extends to non-communicative acts necessarily related to it.  Thus, in an abuse of process claim based on the filing of allegedly false declarations to obtain a default judgment, post-judgment enforcement efforts are protected by the Litigation Privilege.  The court’s conclusion chose the view expressed in Brown v. Kennard (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 40 [113 Cal. Rptr.2d 891] over the contrary view expressed in Drum v. Bleau (2003) 107 Cal.App4th 1009 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 602].

In Wilson v. 21st Century Insurance (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 97 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 514] the Second District acknowledged that an insurer is not acting in bad faith if it delays payment on a first-party claim in the face of a genuine dispute with the insured about the extent of the claim, as held in Chateau Chamberay v. Associated (2001 90 Cal.App.4th 335 [108 Cal.Rprt.2d 776].  It added, however, that the dispute cannot be regarded as genuine unless the insurer makes a thorough and timely investigation.  In this case, there was a question of fact about whether having the insured examined by a neurosurgeon, who confirmed her claim, was reasonable.

In Benavides v. State Farm Ins. Co. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1241 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 650] the Second District said that once it has been held that an insured’s claim was not covered by the policy, the insured cannot succeed in a claim that the insurer negligently investigated the claim, since even if there were such negligence, it did not result in damage.

In Lincoln Foutain Homeowners’ Association v. State Farm (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 999 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 345] the Second District held that Code of Civil Procedure section 340.9, which revives certain time-barred claims against insurers for damage caused by the Northridge earthquake of 1994, does not require an insurer to reinvestigate a claim that was resolved to the insured’s satisfaction.

In Zengen, Inc. v. Comerica Bank (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 861 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 666], the Second District held that common law causes of action against a bank based on the claim that it failed to prevent the fraudulent transfer of funds from a depositor’s account are pre-empted by the California Uniform Commercial Code which requires notice to the bank that informs it of the depositor’s intent to hold it responsible for the fraudulent transfers before an action can be commenced under its provisions.

In Lincoln Property Co, Inc. v Travelers Indemnity Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 905 [41Cal.Rptr.3d 39], the First District held that the previous disposition of a cross claim filed by an insured against its insurer in a third-party action against the insured and in which the insured sought a declaratory judgment regarding coverage by asserting its primary right to a defense under the policy precludes subsequent litigation by the insured against the insurer for damages arising from the insurer’s delay in defending the third-party action.  In reaching its conclusion the court cited Mycogen v. Monsanto (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432].

In Tilbury Constructors v. SCIF (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 466 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 392], the Third District held that the right of a workers’ compensation insurer to recover what it pays in benefits by subrogation of the injured employee’s claim against third parties responsible for the injury does not create a duty to the insured employer to do so in a reasonable way or to do so at all.  The court found support for its conclusion in the decision reached by the California Supreme Court in Jonathan Neil & Assoc v. Jones (2004) 33 Cal.4th 917 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 849].

In County of Santa Clara v. ARCO (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 313], the Sixth District considered various theories raised by a group of public entities in a suit against manufacturers of lead used in paint.  The action was based on the claim that defendants concealed the dangers of lead; engaged in a massive campaign to promote its use in paint for the interiors and exteriors of private residence, public buildings, furniture and toys; failed to warn of the dangers; sold, promoted and distributed lead; and tried to increase the market for lead, discredit evidence of the danger of lead poisoning, and stop regulation of its use.  The court rejected arguments based on the conclusions reached in City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 575 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 876], finding neither to be on all fours with this case.  It concluded that an action for abatement could go forward on a public nuisance theory, but an action for damage could not because the field was fully occupied by products liability law.  It agreed with the trial court’s denial of leave to amend the pleadings to include an action for continuing trespass, citing Fibreboard v. Hartford (1993) 16 Cal.App4th 492 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 376], noting that in this case the presence of lead pain on the premises was by consent of the plaintiffs, which was not vitiated by their lack of knowledge regarding the extent of the dangers posed by lead.  It cited the physical damage rule articulated by the California Supreme Court in Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 718] in finding that economic losses resulting from the alleged necessity of remediating the presence of lead in plaintiff’s buildings was not sufficient to bring about the accrual of causes of action for negligence or strict products liability.  For this reason, the statute of limitations never started running on those actions, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendants on statute of limitations grounds.  On the other hand, it cited Robinson Helicopter v. Dana (2003) 34 Cal.4th 979 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 352] as support for its conclusion that a product liability action for fraud may be brought for economic loss alone, adding that the statute of limitations does not begin running on that action until plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover the harm and its tortuous cause.  Finally, since plaintiff conceded that defendant’s deceptive marketing practices ceased long before the statutory period of limitations on actions under the Unfair Competition Law began running, it held the claim based on that law was time-barred.

In Michael v. Denbeste Transportation, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1082 [40 Cal.Rptr. 3d 777], the Second District held that the “doctrine” established by Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 [2] Cal.Rptr.2d 72] and its progeny, including Kinsman v. Unocal (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 495], prevents the imposition of liability on the hirer of an independent contractor for a job-related injury sustained by an independent contractor hired by the independent contractor.

In Gober v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 204 [40 Cal.Rptr. 3d 92], the Fourth District compared the conduct of defendant grocery chain that knew of sexual harassment by a store manager but transferred him to another store without warning anyone about it with conduct of tobacco companies in deceptively marketing their products with indifference to the health of purchasers.  Based upon that comparison, the court decided that the defendant’s conduct was only moderately reprehensible.  Citing State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 528 U.S. 408 [123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 865] the court concluded that a ratio of punitive to compensatory damages of 6:1 is the constitutionally permissible maximum.  Then, citing Simon v. San Paolo Holding (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159 [29 Cal.Rptr.3d 379], it added that since the constitutionally, permissible maximum is a question of law, a trial court may reduce a jury’s award accordingly on entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and an appellate court may review the trial court’s conclusion, all without the need for a new trial.

In North Coast Women’s Care v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 781 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 636], plaintiff sued a medical provider under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civil Code section 51), claiming that its members refused to perform a procedure upon her because of her sexual orientation.  Defendants asserted that their refusal was based on her marital status.  At the time, the Unruh Civil Rights Act did not prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital status, but Curran v. Count Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts (1998) 17 Cal.4th 670 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 410] had held that it did prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  Subsequent to the accrual of plaintiff’s cause of action, the California Supreme Court decided Koebke v. Bernardo Heights (20025)??? 36 Cal.4th 824 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 565].  In addition, the legislature amended the Unruh Act to include marital status discrimination, stating in a preamble that the amendment was intended to clarify existing law rather than change it.  The Fourth District said it did not think Koebke could be read to extend protection of the Unruh Civil Rights Act to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  The court added, however, that even if it could, it would not be applicable to a cause of action that arose before its publication, because its effect would be to change a rule of law on which the parties relied.  The court also found the statutory amendment changed the law as it had been interpreted by the courts, and since the courts have the power to interpret laws, which the legislature lacks, it could not be applied retroactively in spite of the legislature’s characterization of it as a clarification rather than a change.

In Doran v. North State Grocery Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 484 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 922], the Third District held that a judgment for plaintiff entered on a written agreement to compromise a claim arising under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civil Code section 51) but not based on a finding or concession of fault does not justify the award of attorney fees to plaintiff under Civil Code section 52.  The court distinguished this case from Engel v. Worthington (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 628 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 526] and suggested that plaintiff could have preserved the right to fees by submitting a counteroffer of compromise including an admission of fault.

In Farmers v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 205] the California Supreme Court found it constitutionally permissible for a public entity to require a recipient of subsidy to provide written, unambiguous assurances of compliance with a nondiscrimination policy as a condition of the subsidy.  The court cited a series of decisions of the United States Supreme Court, including Rust v. Sullivan (1991) 500 U.S. 173 [111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed. 233]; Grove City College v. Bell (1984) 465 U.S. 555 [1045 S.Ct. 1211, 79 L.Ed.2d 516]; and Bob Jones University v. United States (1983) 461 U.S. 574 [1033 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157].

In Jacob B v. County of Shasta (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1118 [4] Cal.Rptr.3d 1], the Fourth District cited Wilton v. Mountain Wood (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 565 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 471] and held that the Litigation Privilege of Civil Code section 47(b) can be applied to a stop order as well as to a mechanics’ lien, but only if litigation was contemplated in good faith and given serious consideration when it was filed.  The court noted that if the litigation privilege is not applicable to a stop order, the SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., section 425.16) does not apply to an action arising from it.

In Garcia v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 342 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 902], the Second District held that a person moving a motor vehicle directly from the bed of one transport vehicle to the bed of another is not operating it “on” a street or highway and is not subject to the provisions of Proposition 213 (Civil Code section 3333.4), which otherwise would prevent recovery for non-economic damages in an action arising from an accident occurring during the operation of an uninsured motor vehicle on a street or highway.  The court said application of the dictionary definition “at, by, or near,” as used in Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ruiz (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1197 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 628], would lead to absurd results, noting that Atlantic Mutual concerned the word “on” as used in the uninsured motorist provisions of an automobile liability policy.  This case, on the other hand, required interpretation of the word in a way that would serve the public policy concerns of Proposition 213 as analyzed in Hodges v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 109 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].

In Farmers Insurance v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 842 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 653], the Second District held that statutory sections codifying Proposition 103, concerning the regulation of insurance rates, do not authorize a private cause of action for enforcement.

In TIG Insurance Co. v. Homestore, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 749 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 528], the Second District held that misrepresentation in an application for insurance justify rescission of the entire policy, including its coverage of additional insureds who did not sign the application and were unaware of the misrepresentations, even though policy language provides for rescission of coverage of any person aware of misrepresentations in the application at the time it was made.

In North American Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 627 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 468], the Fifth District held that a Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policy that excluded coverage for liability arising out of employment-related practices, whether the insured is liable as an employer or in any other capacity, did not exclude coverage for a false imprisonment claim by employees of an independent janitorial service hired by the insured who alleged the insured locked them into premises they were cleaning at night.

In National Casualty v. Sovereign General (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 812 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 591], the Third District found that a claim letter received by an insured located in London, England, and mailed by it to its insurer in Stockton, California, was effective when received by the insurer in the United States, precluding it from denying coverage under a “claims made” policy that applied only to claims made in the United States.

In Oak Park Calabasas Condominium Assn. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 557 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 263], the Second District held that an insured who received payment from its insurer for damage to its premises and then refused to pay the contractor it hired to repair those damages was not entitled under “wrongful acts” coverage in the policy to have the insurer defend an action against it by the contractor for non-payment.